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The earlier study of this series of publications ''Shift 
Work in the Paper Industry: Work Experience and Health" has 
opened a discussion about eollaboration with the researchers 
of Sociological Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
and the Medical University of Pecs. In connection with this 
contact and the possible beginning of joint works we are 
Publishing in this series the study "Shopfloor Democracy and 
the Socialist Enterprise: A Hungarian Case Study" by Dr. Csaba 
Mak6, a researcher in the first mentioned organization. The 
subject of the study represents a current and important problem 
area also in Pinland.
In this context it is justifiable to mention that in our 
department the study of work life as a special field of 
sociology is very significant.
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Current issues
In the sixties, in socialist countries, social scientists 
were paying a great deal of attention to Problems related to 
the structure of society and to alienation. From the middle of 
the 70's on, however, a new topic came to the forefront, that 
of industrial democracy and the conditions necessary for this 
to function effectively. The increasing interest in this subjeet 
is shown by the numbers of articles, books and dissertations 
appearing in recent years. There are a number of reasons for 
this debate.
First, the structure and composition of the Hungarian 
working dass has been changing. After the Second World War 
Hungary developed its socialist industry and this process 
established and stabilized working dass power and produced 
new organizational forms of worker participation. At the same 
time, between 19^9 and 1973, the number of industrial workers, 
as compared with the number of all active earners, increased 
from 37 % to 58 %.X
Changes have also occurred in the structure of the working 
dass with a major increase in the proportion of skilled workers 
and managers. The structure of the labour force was also altered 
by the numbers of young people who became wage earners. In 
1973, for the first time, the number of young people under
?
30 exceeded one million. These changes not only increased 
the importance of industrial workers in the Hungarian economy 
and raised living Standards, but also changed the nature of 
workers' needs and expectations. These became more differentiated.
Today while there are people who see work in narrow instrumental 
term3, as a means of earning a living, and are not interested 
in social relations or job content; others wish to participate 
in the decision taking activities of the enterprise. Industrial 
democracy has been stimulated by these new attitudes to work 
and this desire for involvement.
Economic factors have also played a part in the increased 
interest in participation. Since the end of the sixties Hungary 
has exprienced a shortage of labour as traditional sources 
such as agriculture and young people have dried up. This meant 
that economic growth could no longer be a result of increasing 
the size of the industrial labour force. In consequence manpower 
policy and an improved utilization of manpower became a key 
question for management as only in this way could productivity 
be raised.
Worker participation is at the same time a concrete 
exercise of power by the working dass that demonstrates the 
presence or absence of participation in public affairs. As a 
result of Hungary's increasing prosperity, the question of 
"what to live on", is being superseded by that of "how to live";-* 
in other words by an emphasis on the quality of working life.
Job versus power oriented participation
Before describing Hungarian experience with shopfloor 
democracy, we shall discuss briefly what we mean by the term 
participation.
Interest in worker participation goes back to the early 
studies in industrial sociology. On the fiftieth anniversary 
of the Hawthorne experiments Dr. R.L. Kahn re-examined the
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results of that research and suggested that the change in
attitudes within the work groups was not solely a consequence
of the greater attention paid to the workers. It was strongly
influenced by the fact that those taking part in the experiment
were allowed to make decisions about their work and working
conditions. Therefore it was not because the workers were the
centre of attention, the so-called "Hawthorne effect", that
favourable group reactions occurred; it was the opportunity
for participation and for exercising control. Kahn reported
that: "During the 5-year test, people working in the experimental
workshop took part to an increased degree in making decisions
that affected their work and working conditions directly /i.e.
extablishing of time of rest and of the wages/, and they
reacted to these possibilities as Stimulation by displaying 
li
definite activity". But, although the concept of worker 
participation is not new, discussion of how to introduce and 
structure this form of democracy is still very active, and has 
become increasingly active during the 70's. Both theoreticians 
and practitioners expect positive results from the application 
of the "participation principle". In Hungary it is seen not 
only as a means for increasing job satisfaction but also as 
a way of assisting the success of socialist democracy. All 
specialists in participation are agreed on this point even 
though they are interested in different aspects of industrial 
democracy. For example, some scholars are particularly concerned 
with the institutions of participation; others regard their 
primary task as determining the types of decisions to which 
the workers may most usefully contribute. A number see partici­
pation as contributing to the harmonization of workers' needs
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and expectations in work.
There are two principal philosophies of participation.
One focusses on participation in work activities, or "job 
oriented participation". The other takes a wider view and 
views participation as a means for Controlling work performance 
and working conditions. This is the so-called "power /interests/ 
oriented participation". The subacribers to the "job oriented 
participation" philosophy believe that participation in work 
activities and in the design and control of tasks may have 
positive effects, such as increased job 3atisfaction, higher 
achievement, or a lower level of labour turnover. This belief
is based on two sets of theories. First, on theoriea of job
5 . 6design, second, theories denved from psychology.
F.W. Taylor can be ranked among the pioneers of job oriented 
participation even though he called his principles and approach 
"scientific management" and certainly did not have an increase 
in worker control as one of his objectives. Taylor regarded 
the workers' role in industry as similar to that of a cog-wheel 
and he saw management-worker collaboration as a way of improving 
its efficiency. The central idea of scientific management was 
to improve the efficiency of the job. Therefore, management 
analysed and structured the job of each worker with great 
accuracy and thoroughness. In most cases the workers received 
written instructions concerning how they should do their work.
The improvement of efficiency was seen as a product of the 
combined efforts of the management and workers. The workers 
carried out the task but were told not only what to do and how
7
to do it but how long to spend on each task.'
Since the beginning of this Century two major changes
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have occurred in the social-economic conditions of industry.
These changes have influenced the nature of workers' needs 
and expectations, as well as of the requirements of the organi- 
zation. For example, the educational level of the workers 
has considerably increased, while the meeting of basic human 
needs is today virtually guaranteed. Therefore, it is no longer 
acceptable to let the structure of jobs be determined solely 
by the demands of technology and of efficient administration. 
Consideration must also be given to the needs and expectations 
of the workers. Here the philosophies of the Socio-Technical 
and Job Design schools of thought provide useful guidance.
O
These differ from the traditional concept of job satisfaction
- which implies that the worker will adapt to his job - in 
that they strive to meet the workers' needs through the way 
in which technology is used and jobs are structured. The 
requirements of technology are no longer given priority over 
the workers' social needs.
Although the use of socio-technical principles does 
nothing to destroy the logic of mass production, it at least 
shows an awareness that the nature of workers' needs has undergone 
a considerable change during the last half Century.
The idea of job oriented participation takes an unusual 
form in the work of Hungarian scholars interested in shopfloor 
democracy. This defines worker participation as an active and 
regulär participation in all production activities with in­
creased involvement leading to greater responslbility. This 
view implies that the development of worker participation 
depends upon two factors: first, the workers' maturity sind 
awareness and, second, on the effectiveness of communication.
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Management's principal task is to keep the workers clearly 
and adequately informed of the most important issues affecting 
their work. The workers are then in a Position to express a 
view on even the most difficult and complicated questions.
Scholars interested in identifLyng the conditions necessary 
for effective participation have dealt chiefly with questions 
such as the following: the relationship between managerial 
autonomy and collective leadership; the difference between 
the officially accepted and actual competences of management; 
the nature of worker participation at different stages of 
decision taking - i.e. the first proposal to the final decision, 
and the amount of contact needed with different management 
levels and functions - to ensure that participation is effective. 
This research has produced many theoretical ideas of assistance
Q
to management thinking.
Hungarian adherents of job oriented participation have 
called attention to several important aspects of shopfloor 
democracy; for example, to the need for different kinds of 
participation at different stages of decision making; to the 
necessity for clear and effective systems of communication, 
and to the need for determining an eyuitable division of 
managing rights and responsibilities. This research generally 
focusses on problems of interest to management.
Less attention is paid, however, to other aspects of 
industrial democracy. There is little examination of participation 
in practice and little investigation of how different organizational 
structures and'objectives assist or-hinder the satisfaction of 
workers1 needs. Production efficiency and high level work 
performance are viewed as important objectives for all socialist
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enterprises and it is assuraed that workers will automatically 
identify themselves with these. If this does not happen then 
it is due to workers not fully understanding the nature of 
these objectives and it is management's task to inform and 
convince them. But it is not solely a lack of understanding 
that impedes successful worker participation, more complex 
questions are involved, many of which relate to the nature of 
work itself.
Job oriented participation therefore focusses upon only 
one aspect of the workers' participation, although a very 
important aspect, namely the improvement of work efficiency.
It does not consider questions of different or conflicting 
interests or of power. Yet these explain much of the resistance 
with which initiatives aimed at introducing new forms of work 
organizations are received. Often it is not the trade unions, 
but the workers themselves who refuse opportunities for more 
influence and independence in their work activities. The basis 
of their objections is usually that greater responsibility 
will not lead to higher earnings.10 The reaction has been 
encountered, for example, when a work group is allowed to decide 
on how wages shall be divided within the group but is unable 
to control those factors that affect the amount the group can 
earn - availability of raw materials, machine stoppages etc. 
Also, giving work groups responsibility for decision taking 
impinges on management’s interests and power. Certain levels 
of management such as foremen may feel their job is losing its 
status and importance. This can explain managerial Opposition 
to increased worker participation; and can lead to attempts 
to preserve traditional methods and philosophy. All of these
reactions emphasise the need to take a broader view of job 
oriented participation. In order to understand the conditions 
for suecessful participation, we have to go outside the narrow 
dimensions of work and examine power and interest relationships 
within the organization and even within society.
This approach is called power oriented participation. Its 
objective is to increase workers' influence within socialist 
enterprises in those areas of decision making which affect 
their interests. It will be asked why the concept of power 
oriented participation has relevance in a socialist society 
where there are no irreconcilable and fundamental contradictions 
between the intere3ts of. the various social groups. Surely job 
oriented participation will meet the needs of the socialist 
enterprise.
However, it is a well-known and established fact that the 
objectives of socialist society and the socialist enterprise do 
not coincide automatically with the interests and aims of 
individuals and groups. Because of the division of labour, 
differences and conflicts can occur between central and local 
organizations, between different functions and between different 
groups of workers within the same plant, as well as between 
workers and management. It follows that a fundamental question 
for socialist enterprises is how to maintain the co-operation 
of individuals and groups while internal and external conditions 
are constantly changing.
Since co-operation is a product of common interests, the 
main task of management is the reconciliation of different 
interests.
The stable functioning of an organization requires both 
technological and economic efficiency and an ability to meet
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the interests of different groups of employees. Technological 
and economic efficiency is usually catered for in the way in 
which the enterprise is structured. But this structure affects 
the interests of the individuals and groups responsible for 
production. Management can assist the satisfaction of workers' 
interests through its personnel policies and reward systems.11' 
Although the satisfaction of workers' interests is also 
influenced by the opportunities for action outside the or- 
ganization. The social-economic environment of the enterprise 
not only stimulates needs and interests but also contributes 
to the satisfaction of these.
Interests: the relationship between socio-organizational 
conditions and employee needs
Interests are defined as attitudes which are a product
of socially defined human needs and of the socio-organizational
conditions which determine their satisfaction, for example,
work organization and promotion and financial reward systems.
Different human needs and socio-organizational conditions
produce different structures of interests. Hungarian research
shows that financial-economic factors dominate workers' needs
12/e.g. the level of earnings/. This does not mean, however, 
that workers are only interested in what they can earn and 
place little importance on other aspects of work. Their need 
structure is a constellation of factors in which each has its 
own degree of emphasls. For instance, in addition to economic 
rewards, workers place great importance on the social circumstances 
in which they work "to earn their money". The results of the 
Hungarian contribution to an international study on "Automation
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and the industrial workers", showed this clearly.1  ^
Significant Correlation Between 'Job Provides1 
Items and General Job Satisfaction
'Job Provides ' Items Correlat Ions
A. Work content
1. Knowledge and Training 0.17
2. Opportunity to Learn New Things 0.13
3. Interesting Work 0.25
4. Chance to Develop Abilities 0.27
5. Chance to Develop Professional Knowledge 0.23
B. Pay
1. ßood Pay 0.33
C. Management
1. Supervisor Gives Instructions 0.20
2. Supervisor Listens to You 0.22
3. Supervisor Gives Just Reward 0.37
4. Supervisor has sufficient Skills 0.28
Satisfaction was closely associated with opportunities 
for "good pay" /0.33/ and with a belief that Supervisors 
rewarded workers fairly /0.37/* This shows that even at the 
present level of Hungarian socio-economic development workers 
are still interested in more money. They attach great importance 
to getting ’a fair wage for a fair day's work'. But shopfloor 
democracy and worker participation means more than the 
satisfaction of the workers' economic needs, it is not the 
same as "wage-bargaining". In order to understand the 
conditions for effective participation we have to examine the 
totality of workers' needs.
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Participation opportunities and requirements
In the life of the enterprise everything directly or 
indirectly affects working conditions, and changes in these, 
in turn, influence the nature of workers' interests. But re- 
cognition that "everything connects with everything" does not 
assist understanding. We need to know which factors are of 
greater and lesser importance to workers and appreciate how 
different socio-organizational conditions affect worker 
satisfaction. We can then attempt to establish the most 
appropriate subjects for participative decision taking.
To summarize, in the present stage of Hungarian socio- 
economic development the workers' economic needs are still the 
most important influences on satisfaction. Workers are extremely 
interested in how changes in working conditions will influence 
their wages and financial prospects. This emphasis on economic 
factors influences workers' attitudes to participation in 
decision taking.
The workers' view of opportunities for participation 
broadly corresponded with that of the managers. Both workers 
and managers indicated an absence of opportunities for partici­
pation in questions such as: the development of the production 
plan, the introduction of new machinery and equipment, personnel 
planning and the hiring of workers.
12
Workers* and managers* opinion of the opportunity for participation*
Workers* opinion Managers» opiilion**
Opportunity for Opportunity for 
participation participation 
Types of Decisions Doesn't Doesn't
Yes No know Yes No know
--- ;___________ £_JE__1 £ £ *
1 . Work organization and 
work conditions 75 24 1 60 40 -
2 . Selection of workers 
for training courses 64 28 8 96 — 4
3. Allocation of over­
time work 61 36 3 90 10 —
4. Determination of 
bonuses and other 
incentives 57 40 3 100 . .
5. Workers* job classifi- 
cation and pay scale 49 48 3 97 3 -
6 . Promotion of workers 48 45 7 100 -
7. Determination of basis 
and methods of wage 
payment 46 52 2 63 37
8. Lay-off and discharge 
of workers 45 45 10 83 17 -
9. Disciplinary measures 44 48 8 80 20
1 0. Transfer to other 
work places 42 52 6 87 13 -
1 1. Development of 
production plan 30 59 11 10 86 4
1 2 . Introduction of new 
machinery and equipment 24 65 11 7 93 -
13. Personnel planning 
/planning of fut\rre 
workforce demands/ 13 76 11 17 83
14. Hiring of worker« 11 82 7 10 87
Source; Hethy, L-Mako, Cs.! Az automatizacio es a munkastudat 
/Automation and How the Worker Thinks About It/ A Publication of 
the Sociological Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences and the Scientific Research Institute for Labour Safety 
of the Hungarian TÜC. Budapest, 1975. pp.96-97» and the Plates 
of Research Instrument II. /Management Questionnaire/ Non 
published data.
^Workers and managers worked in the same departments. Thus the workers 
were the subordinates of the managers in the Table.
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Both workers and managers perceived opportunities for 
selecting workers for training courses, the allocation of 
overtime work and of bonuses, and the determination of other 
incentives.
Differences in the opinions of workers and managers are 
to be found in questions such as: workers1 job classification 
and promotion, the determination of the basis and methods of 
wage pyment, the discharge of workers and matters relating to 
discipline and job transfer. In these decision areas the workers 
suggest that decisions are taken by managers alone, or jointly 
with the workers, in equal proportions. Managers however believe 
that these decisions are all made jointly.
Workers' and managers' opinions on opportunities for 
participation are therefore similar. They perceive joint decisions 
on questions which directly affect the workers' job but little 
participation in matters which have a less direct influence 
on worker3.
The willingness of workers to share in plant-wide decision- 
making is related to opportunities for participation. In the 
research on 'Automation and Workers' a majority of respondents 
/52 it/ expressed a willingness to participate in decisions 
affecting their own work, and two-thirds of the most skilled 
workers /machine-adjusters/ were prepared to do this. However,
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the percentage of workers who would like to participate in 
all plant-wide decisions hardly exceeds one-third /33.5 >/ of 
the respondents, and only one-fifth of the most qualified 
workers desired such extensive participation.
Desired participation is, therefore, closely related to 
opportunities for participation. But research on shopfloor 
democracy suggests that successful participation requires more 
from workers than a willingness to participate. First, shared 
decision-making requires particular social and psychological 
skills; second, it requires a level of motivation higher than 
that traditionally expected of workers. Until now such skills 
and motivation were regarded as management's prerogative.
Worker participation: required skills and motivation
Power oriented participation requires from the workers 
individual or collective skills which enable them to recognize, 
and also to press and enforce their interests. They need to 
possess the knowledge, means and opportunities for action 
through which they can achieve their individual or collective 
interests within the enterprise. This means that they must be 
clear about their needs, and also appreciate the social- 
organizational conditions which permit the satisfaction of 
these needs. In addition, the workers have to choose, and 
get management and other groups of workers to accept, the 
strategies most likely to assist the realization of their 
interests.
The ability of a group to achieve its interests^-1* is 
influenced by such factors as: the level of general and Pro­
fessional education, length of service, intelligence, etc.
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These are, however, necessary but not sufficient conditions.
The critical factor is the action alternatives permitted to 
the group by other groups. Therefore the ability of a group 
to realize its interests requires both personal abilities 
and support from other groups.
We have suggested that opportunities for change within
an organization play a major part in developing the necessary
skills to achieve change. Since the 60s, the demand for labour
has grown in Hungary, whilst the supply of labour has remained
static or decreased. As a result, labour turnover has increased.
This has provided the workers with opportunities for securing 
15wage mcreases. From a scciological point of view, leaving 
a firm can be regarded as the utilization of one of the many 
alternatives for action available to the workers; it is also 
an effective strategy for achieving their interests. Increased 
labour turnover has called attention to the "price" of workers' 
participation.
Managers sometimes regard the right to intervene in decisions 
of various types as a "gift" presented to the workers. Those 
who hold this view expect that workers will accept opportunities 
for participation without questioning the scope or nature of 
these. In their view the workers will be glad to take advantage 
of increased opportunities for participation. Sociological 
studies of worker participation, and other research, does 
not, however, support thi3 optimistic assumption.
Evidence suggests that workers do not always make use 
of the new opportunities afforded to them. And in those 
workshops where workers have accepted the opportunity for 
participation,1  ^managers-workers relationships have not taken
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a "donor-donee" form. In these situations management was 
aware that the coordination of different interests required 
effort and motivation from both managers and workers, with 
workers willing to assume responsibilities very different from 
their traditional ones. But worker participation which involves 
the reconciliation of different interests will always have its 
winners and losers. The social-economic position of one work 
group will become stronger or more stable, while that of another 
will weaken. Inevitably this will lead to strained relations. 
Therefore management has to recognize that a form of shopfloor 
democracy which requires the coordination of different interests 
must also involve social, conflict.
Management without participation does not require this 
kind of motivation from workers. Only those with managerial 
responsibilities are required to handle social conflict. There­
fore worker participation based on achieving consensus and 
agreement requires both a new structure of tasks and responsi­
bilities and new ways of handling power. Workers will have 
to be able to cope with the psychological stress associated 
with mediating between different attitudes and demands. They 
will also have to accept the risk that their suggestions, if 
implemented, may not produce the improvement^ they seek. 
ünsuccessful ideas will almost certainly directly or indirectly 
affect the social-economic position and interests of other 
managers and workers. For example, if at a consultative meeting, 
workers ask for an improvement in the Standards of machine 
maintenance, they then effectively take on the role of the 
maintenance section supervision, and even that of the maintenance 
men themselves. This criticism of maintenance will affect the
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relationships between machine operators and maintenance staff
and supervision and can cause bad feeling. In this way reducing
worker solidarity. It is these kinds of social conflicts that
17"raise the price" of worker participation in plant-wide 
decisions, and management must recognize this when extending 
shopfloor democracy. Moreover, workers will not always express 
their doubts openly about management's proposals, preferring 
to assume a position of "wait and see". Workers who are 
reasonably satisfied with their social-economic position may 
not be interested in participating in decision taking and this 
may slow down the length of time required for management to 
reach agreement with the workers. Even when management proposals 
are seen as unacceptable, workers may prefer to leave the plant 
rather than enter into open conflict with management. From 
their point of view this is a ’cheaper' way of looking after 
their interests than arguing with management about plant de­
cisions.
However, socialist industrial relations do assist the 
reconciliation of different interests, and difficulties are 
not as great as the previous section might suggest. The 
socialist enterprise is structured in such a way that the 
technical, economic and organizational requirements of production 
can be achieved through cooperative effort. Shortages of labour 
and the need to increase efficiency make Company management 
take account of workers' interests, but, in addition the 
socialist enterprise has an organizational structure that 
assists Cooperation. In this the trade union and party orga­
nization have a major role in maintaining the level of Cooperation 
necessary for effective production. If management overstresses
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the technical and economic requirements of production, the 
enterprise's trade union and party organization must emphasize 
human needs. Moreover, it is the party organizations and the 
trade unions that are responsible for shopfloor democracy and 
worker participation.
Decentralization of the wage plan: a case study 
The problem
In Hungary wage levels are still the most important issue 
for workers. Because of this, great weight is attached to all 
programmes and initiatives that try to bring together workers' 
demands and management's requirements in this area. The de­
centralization of the wage plan is one mechanism for achieving 
this harmony of interests, and this approach means that a 
decision role in determining wages is given to the workers. 
Effectively this extends the responsibilities of workers as 
they were asked to perform tasks previously seen as management's 
prerogative.
The initiative described in the following section took
place in one of the most dynamic and expanding factories of
1R
the public vehicle industry.
At the end of the 60s, due to a change in market requirements, 
management had to rapidly alter the structure of the firm's 
products. At the same time as introducing new products, Diesel 
engines, the management of the Company set high priority on 
the more economic manufacture of its old products, railway 
coaches. In addition to increasing efficiency management also 
wished to reduce the high rate of labour turnover and both of
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these problems focussed management's attention on questions 
of organization and incentives. Labour turnover in recent years 
had increased to such an extent that certain work groups had 
experienced a complete change of members.
The research Situation
In the factory where the wage plan was to be decentralized, 
the middle stage of railway ooach construction was performed; 
the assembly of the body. The work was carried out in three 
workshops: 1/ a spare parts workshop where sheets of metal 
were cut to the required size, and brackets etc. were produced 
for the assembly shop. 2/ The assembly shop where the body 
was fitted together on the Chassis. 3/ The finishing shop where 
fitters removed flaws from the sheet metal by heating and 
hammering. All fitters and welders used hand tools and very 
simple machines and appliances. The basis for a group system 
of wages was provided by the co-operative character of the 
work process. Where a group system was not appropriate,
'high paying' and 'low paying' jobs were designated. For a 
long time therefore, management had used a group system of 
payment in which workers were allocated an hourly rate of pay.
Management wished to increase the efficiency of production 
by changing the basis for dividing up the earnings at a work 
groups disposal. Personal rates were to be replaced by earnings 
which were more related to individual output. The workers 
themselves were now authorized to set new personal wage rates, 
whereas formerly the criteria for these were determined by 
the Personnel Department on the basis of Professional qualifi- 
cations, length of service, job difficulty etc.,.rather than
the actual output of individual members of the work group.
The hopes of management and the reactions of the workers
Management hoped that the level of earnings within each 
work group would more closely reflect personal effort and skill.
In this way the new wage 3tructure would provide more incentive 
and increase the motivation of the workers. Furthermore, it 
expected that the workers1 willingness to participate ir. 
decision taking would grow as in setting wage rates they were 
making decisions that directly affected their personal interests.
Contrary to the management's expectations, the workers 
did not unanimously welcome their greater independence in the 
setting of wage rates, and two divergent sets of attitude3 
were encountered. The majority of the work groups - fourteen 
out of nineteen - made use of the opportunity offered by the 
Company and changed the previous system of wage rates. 
Unfortunately, in contradiction to management's objectives, 
the new wage rates led to more uniform level3 of earnings and 
failed to reflect individual differences in output. The other 
groups did not change the existing structure of personal 
hourly rates and refused the new opportunity for decision.
In these groups the workers did not wish to alter the establisched 
pay hierarchy.
Kow is it that despite a thorough and careful preparation 
by management the workers did not identify with the aim of 
gaining an increase in output by decentralizing the wage plan?
Why were they not eager to make use of increased autonomy 
in the area of wage decisions?
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Different interests and different abilities to enforce these 
Interests
It appeared that worker participation in wage decisions 
was influenced by the socio-organizational conditions under 
which they lived and worked. This led to a differentiation of 
interests with the interests of some groups being very different 
from those of others. Similarly, there were considerable 
differences in a group's ability to achieve its interests.
These social factors led to the differences in response to 
the opportunity for participation in wage decisions.
Relationships within those groups rejecting the opportunity 
for participation in wage decisions were characterized by 
homogeneity /Type ”A"/. Behaviour was directed at achieving
group solidarity and frequently these groups had a powerful
. . IQunofficial nucleus made up of a number of cliques. Members
of these groups recognized their common interests and were
able to enforce these interests officially and unofficially.
To understand this behaviour we need to know something of
the economic needs of these workers and of the social
organization that produced such strong feelings of collectivity.
Before answering these questions, we shall describe briefly 
the structure of the work groups that accepted the opportunities 
for decision taking offered to them. In those work groups 
that identified with management's objectives /Type "B"/ 
there was much less solidarity. There was no nucleus of cliques 
to co-ordinate different interests and establish common interest3. 
The informal structure of these work groups was unstable and 
undeveloped and they were characterized by internal conflict;
- 22 -
the tendency to disagree was stronger than the tendency to 
agree. Therefore they are unable to oppose any management 
initiatives. The social and economic characteristics of the 
members of groups of type "A" and "B" differed considerably.
In the following section we shall describe these differences.
The influence of different socio- 
economic backgrounds
Workers who belonged to work groups of type "A" differ 
considerably from workers belonging to type "B". Their personal 
wage rates were higher and more uniform for differences in 
skill level were minimal. The proportion of long service 
workers, more than 10 years with the firm, greatly exceeded 
that of workers belonging to type "B". This is shown in the 
following table.
Socio-economic Backgrounds of Work Group Members
Type
of
Personal Wage Rate 
/forints/
Skilied Company Service Above 
/above 10 years/ Age
Group Average Coefficient of 
Variation
Thirty
80.3 53.0 65.1"A" 8.35 0.64
"B" 7.85 1.20 78.2 25.2 32.8
Differ-
ence
/A-B/ 0.50 - 0.56 - 2.1 27.8 32.3
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Attitudes and behaviour are also influenced by the
socio-economic environment outside the firm, for workers
bring with them into the factory a number of different
20onentations towards work. Therefore in order to fully
understand workers' reactions to the decentralization of the
wage plan, we have to go outside the firm. Worker expectations
which are a product of their socio-economic backgrounds also
affect their attitudes and these influences may be stronger
than social and organizational factors within the firm.
In vjo-rk groups of type "A", a majority of the workers
had a faitily an$ about two-thirds of them were flat-owners
or tenants.'- In contrast in work groups of type "B", the
prpportion of married and single workers was equal, while
21only one-third had a flat. There were also differences in 
the age structure of work group members. A majority of workers 
opposing management's suggestions were over thirty, whilst 
the greater part of those identifying themselves with Company 
objectives were under thirty. We recognized here that once 
workers reach thirty considerable changes occur in their 
social-economic position both inside and outside the firm.
An understanding of workers' attitudes to financial 
incentives requires a knowledge of how the wage plan developed. 
Taking skilled fitters as an example, we examined the 
differences between the old and new system of personal wage
rates. These are shown in the following table.
It appears from the table that the wage system suggested 
by management and agreed by the workers reduces the workers' 
opportunities for pay increases, for the ceiling wage is reached 
more rapidly. This was apparent only to long service employees,
_ 2H -
since during the first ten years of employment the new 
incentive system allowed higher wage increases than the old 
one. It therefore strengthened short-term interests to the 
detriment of long-term interests, although the younger workers 
did not oonsider this important.
Wage promotion of skilled workers
Company
Service
/years/
The rate
In the old system of 
personal wage rate
of wage increases
In the new system of 
personal wage rate
Forints* * Forints %
0-10 3.0 76.9 3.56 96.1
10-20 0.80 20.5 0.12 3.3
20-30 0.10 2.6 0.02 0.6
0-30 3.90 100.0 3.70 100.0
xForint is the Hungarian money and the means of payment.
To sum up, management endeavours to alter the wage structure 
produced the following responses:
A. Negative reactions. or a refusal to accept the decentrali- 
zation of the wage plan or the equalization of wages. This 
marked the behaviour of members belonging to work groups of 
type "A". These groups were characterized by group cohesion 
and a recognition of common interests. A minority of these 
groups rejected management's suggestion of decentralizing 
decisions, because this would not lead to higher earnings, 
merely to a redistribution of current earnings. However, a 
majority of groups appeared to accept management's objectives, 
but used their increased independence in decision taking in
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a manner contrary to the suggestions of management. Thus 
instead of earnings becoming more related to output, in faot 
they became more equal and uniform. The workers took as their 
main objective an increase in the earnings of workers with low 
wages so that group inequalities would be diminished. The 
intention here was to reduce any sources of conflict within 
the work group.
Greater equalization of wages emphasized common interests 
and increased feelings of solidarity; this in turn increased 
the work group's power and ability to enforce its interests.
In this way they have strengthened their future negotiating 
position and will be better able to accept or reject management 
proposals on their merits.
B. Positive reactions
Working groups of type "B" were characterized by lack 
of unity and conflicts of interest and these workers 
experienced conaiderable pressure from their financial 
responsibilities outside the firm. The majority bore the 
bürden of founding a family and were either saving money for 
major future investments such as home building, the purchase 
of furniture, etc. or were paying off previously incurred 
credits. The new incentive system meant that they would 
receive a wage increase. They had little industrial 
experience and were unable to collectively pursue their 
interests. These groups also contained young people who lived 
with their parents and were not under financial pressure. 
Leisure time was the most important factor in their lives and
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they required from work only "pocket-money" and an easy time.
In work groups of this kind the spread of interests was so 
great that common interests could not develop. Collective 
interests and a collective capacity for enforcing these interests 
did not exist.
A lack of power characterized these groups and therefore 
they could not resist the ideas of management, nor were they 
anxious to oppose these. Young married workers with heavy 
financial burdens were interested in higher wages for higher 
output and nothing eise. Single workers were indifferent 
to what happened in the work Situation. Yet it was only in 
these work groups that the management could realize the 
objectives associated with the decentralization of the wage 
plan: a differentiation of wages and an increase in output.
Some lessons
This case study on the decentralization of a wage plan 
draws attention to the following lessons. Measures that are 
logical from an incentive point of view may produce unforeseen 
consequences. Even when new ideas are carefully prepared and 
ideologically supported, we have to recognize that workers 
will not respond to them in the same way.
Innovations that combine a desire for higher production 
with more worker authority and autonomy are not always given 
a "good reception". Differences of opinion between managers 
and workers can be understood by examining both group 
int»rests and the capasity of a group to enforce its 
interests. Workers are willing to assume decision making 
responsibility which involves greater responsibility and risk
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only if this implies a greater ability to project and enforce 
individual and collective interests within the group.
In work groups where there are few common interests,
a compromise between individual interests and Company's 
interests may be more easily brought about. For the majority 
of workers in the case study the new incentive system would 
lead, in the short term, to increased wages. In contrast, 
cohesive work groups with perceived common interests can 
use partioipation and decision taking opportunities provided 
by management to further their own interests at the expense 
of management. In the case study they used such an 
opportunity to decrease the wage differences of group members.
The case study shows that the concept of job oriented 
participation - that workers wish to take decisions about 
their own work - is not sufficient to explain participation 
behaviour. Ideas for co-ordinating workers' needs and 
management.'.ö requirements generally fail to consider
differences in individual and work group interests and in
the ability to enrorce these interests. This approach is based 
on the belief that workers' actions can be deduced from a 
broad understanding of their needs; once these needs are 
known then it is possible to influence behaviour. We do not 
deny the usefulness of participation programmes based on an 
indentification of needs; for example, need3 for discretion, 
autonomy etc. But we argue that participation behaviours 
cannot be deduced directly from needs. Human needs are always 
influenced by the social-organizational conditons which 
determine their satisfaction.
If the case study management had taken into account not
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only the workers' needs but also those social and organizational 
factors which influenced the way in which these needs could be 
satisfied, then a compromise of interests might have been 
possible. Job oriented participation would then have coincided 
with power oriented participation. Changes in the wage plan 
had to fit both with needs for participation and with the 
desire of powerful work groups to increase group cohesion and 
reduce potential areas of conflict between group members. 
Hungarian industrial sociology is paying increasing attention 
to these problems.
Models of Human Behaviour - management - participation
The development of concepts of worker participation 
cannot be separated from models of human behaviour. In the 
case study firm management permitted participation only in 
the execution phase of the wage plan and saw the workers as 
''homo-oeconomicua". It believed that by taking actions it 
could produce certain responses. Yet it toök account of 
financial motives only and designed and applied the incentive 
systems accordingly. This kind of approach was first set out 
in the principles of the Scientific Management. F.W. Taylor 
described such an approach, although without worker partici­
pation, when he declared that there was only "one best way" 
of performing certain tasks. This philosophy renders 
unnecessary all dialogue between workers and managers. If 
management works out scientifically - by means of time and 
motion studies, etc. - the best way of performing tasks, then 
there is nothing left but the selection and training of
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workers, and there is no need to bring the workers and 
management together. Suitably selected and trained workers, 
once they receive the correct wage for their level of output, 
will be ready, without reserve, to carry out the requirements 
of management.
In contrast to Scientific Management's view of man, the 
Human Relations movement emphasized that "human beings have 
not only hands, but heart as well". It emphasized non-financial 
factors, such as social relationships, style of supervision, 
etc. This approach led to new theories of motivation and "homo 
psychologicus" appeared on the management scene. According 
to this theory, organizations function efficiently if both 
the financial and psychological needs of workers are satisfied. 
The main task of management is then to co-ordinate organizational 
reguirements and individual psychological needs.
While the Scientific Management saw human co-operation
as a response to economic factors, motivation theories underlined
22the importance of psychological needs. A management which 
accepts the "homo psychologicus" concept welcomes worker 
participation in decisions concerning work activities. Job 
oriented participation theory is based on this human model. 
Through making worker participation possible, management 
expects in return a positive response to its suggestions.
Economic or psychological models of human behaviour are 
not, however, sufficient to enable us to understand all the 
phenomena associated with functioning of an industrial 
organization. These models remove human beings from the 
complexity of the social-organizational relations. They 
associate human co-operation with individual needs and
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responses. They ignore the fact that human co-operation must 
be seen in a multi-dimensional organizational context.
The nature and content of the social conflicts 
accompanying attempts to achieve co-operation has drawn 
attention to the complexity and instability of social 
processes within an organization. Worker behaviour is not only 
influenced by Position in the organizational hierarchy and 
membership of a work group, but also by social relations 
outside the enterprise. The influence of these external 
pressures can make workers impervious to management influence.
These social-organizational relations are less affected 
by needs than by interests and interests are the main motivating 
factor in industrial organizations. Therefore it is mainly by 
influencing interests that management can affect behaviour. 
However, management has only a limited ability to mould 
interests within the organization and can exert no influence 
outside. The workers, too, have an ability to enforce their 
interests which is outside the control of management. This 
guarantees for them a considerable autonomy of action within 
the firm or* workshop. Therefore the process of co-ordinating 
interests to secure co-operation cannot take place when only 
management plays an active role and the workers are seen as 
passive by-standers.
In the case study management tried to increase worker 
participation through a decentralization of the wage plan.
Yet because this did not coincide with the workers' interests 
they were able to frustrate management's intention. The 
responses of workers were determined both by their interests 
and by their ability to enforce these interests. Some work 
groups had the power to totally reject the suggestions of
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management, and to refuse to accept the opportunities for 
increased participation offered to them. Even those groups which 
accepted a new decision malfing role used this in a way that did 
not fit with management intentions. Instead of increasing the 
differentiation of wage rates, they decreased this.
Management alone cannot create and influence the conditions 
for co-operation within an organization. Theories of "homo 
oeconomicus" and "homo psychologicus" can only influence worker 
behaviour to a restricted degree. Only by mutual effort can 
management and workers influence the social-organizatiohal 
conditions affecting their interests. The co-ordination of 
interests requires negotiation and bargaining between the two 
groups. Through power oriented participation it is possible to 
gain an understanding of different interests and to work out a 
mutually acceptable compromise.
To acnieve this more is required than creating the conditions 
for job oriented participation. This wider type of participation 
guarantees for the workers not only control of work activities, 
but also an influence on the interests and power relationships of 
the enterprise. At the same time it implies a form of management 
that not only permits, but also requires, continuous bargaining 
with workers and the reconciliation of different interests. In 
this way management is able to gain an understanding of the 
complex social-organizational conditions that determine what can 
and cannot be done. Considerable progress can only be expected 
when we no longer see job and the power oriented participation as 
mutually exclusive, but as preconditions for each other. The 
long-term commitment of workers to participation can only be 
guaranteed in this way.
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